Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

2011

Taxing Soft Drinks
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy W., "Taxing Soft Drinks" (2011). ICEPP Working Papers. 86.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/86

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

International Studies Program
Working Paper 11-06
April 2011

Taxing Soft Drinks

Roy Bahl

International Studies Program
Working Paper 11-06

Taxing Soft Drinks
Roy Bahl
April 2011

International Studies Program
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 651-1144
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: ispaysps@gsu.edu
Internet: http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu
Copyright 2006, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. No part
of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Studies Program
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Studies Program.
The mission of the International Studies Program is to provide academic and professional
training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and
sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.
The International Studies Program at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies is recognized
worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through technical
assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a diverse client
base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government
organizations, legislative bodies and private sector institutions.
The success of the International Studies Program reflects the breadth and depth of the in-house
technical expertise that the International Studies Program can draw upon. The Andrew Young
School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have authored books,
published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive experience in
designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew Young School
faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40countries around the world. Our technical
assistance strategy is not to merely provide technical prescriptions for policy reform, but to
engage in a collaborative effort with the host government and donor agency to identify and
analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions and implement reforms.
The International Studies Program specializes in four broad policy areas:





Fiscal policy, including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform
Fiscal decentralization, including fiscal decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental
transfer systems, urban government finance
Budgeting and fiscal management, including local government budgeting, performancebased budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting
Economic analysis and revenue forecasting, including micro-simulation, time series
forecasting,

For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu or contact us by email at ispaysps@gsu.edu.

Taxing Soft Drinks1
Roy Bahl*
*Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia

1

A revision of this paper is forthcoming in Sijbren Cnossen, ed., Excise Tax Policy and
Administration, University of South Africa, Pretoria.

Roy Bahl is Regents Professor of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia
State University, Atlanta Georgia.

1

2

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

1 Introduction
In low income countries every budget season brings the challenge of
cutting needed programs or taking the unpopular step of raising taxes. In this
setting, the imposition of a special tax on soft drinks is a fiscal temptation. Soft
drinks are a highly visible product, usually produced by a foreign company with
good compliance habits, and are alleged to bring health problems with their
consumption. The revenue amounts may not be great but the pickings are
relatively easy. Many governments in developing countries do impose a special
excise tax on soft drink consumption. The question raised in this chapter is
whether they should.
This paper begins with a discussion of the general approach to soft drink
taxation, and a description of the practice in a number of African countries. Then
we turn to the question of whether these excises are discriminating, review the
traditional justifications for a special excise, and apply this thinking to the case of
soft drinks. The paper concludes with a summary of findings and a discussion of
the cost of getting it wrong, i.e., the cost of imposing a discriminatory excise
when it is not warranted.

2

The Practice: African Examples

A commonly found business model is for soft drinks to be produced and
distributed by a partnership of a foreign company and a local bottler. The usual
distribution of responsibility is that the foreign company is responsible for
supplying the concentrate and for marketing, while the bottler imports the inputs,
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mixes the concentrate, bottles and distributes the product. The market is usually
dominated by the foreign, popular brand name soft drinks.

2.1

The Taxation of Soft Drinks2

Countries are different in terms of how they structure their tax regimes,
and in terms of the revenue importance they assign to each tax, but the general
approach to bringing soft drinks into the tax base is more or less the same as for
other consumer goods.
In Table 1, we describe the major taxes to which soft drinks usually are
subjected, and we offer a view about what would constitute discriminatory
treatment. The country example on which we base the description in Table 1 is
Ghana, but a reasonable proposition is that this is similar to the tax treatment of
soft drinks in other countries. The customs duty, excise tax, value added tax and
corporate income tax are collected directly from the bottler, and their employees
are subject to individual income taxes and payroll taxes according to the tax
code. In the case of corporate income taxes and PAYE, there would not appear
to be any discrimination against soft drink producers vs. other producers in the
formal sector.3
Most raw material inputs for soft drinks are imported, and are subject to
the normal concessional duty rate on raw materials.

2

This concessional rate

For purposes of taxation, soft drinks may be singled out as a taxable item or may be treated as
a class of goods that are labeled “table waters”, “mineral water” or “carbonated beverages.”
3
Soft drink bottlers are not usually candidates for corporate income tax incentives. If other
companies do receive incentives, then it might be argued that the soft drink bottler is treated in a
differential way. However, this is no different from the tax treatment faced by other non-incentive
firms.

4
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applies to the concentrate, sugar, and other inputs such as containers and caps.
This is consistent with the normal practice for manufactured goods as set out in
the customs code in most countries. The duty rate charged these imports is
normally the same as that charged to most imported food and clothing items. 4 It
is less the norm for imports for soft drink production to be taxed in a
discriminatory way.
Soft drinks face a discriminatory tax treatment in some countries in that
they are subject to an excise tax, over and above the VAT. Typically only a small
number of consumer goods pay the excise tax. The marquee cases are those
items whose consumption generates social costs, e.g., alcohol, tobacco and
motor fuels. The base of the excise tax may be specific or ad valorem, and is
usually measured in the latter case as the manufacturer’s cost plus margin. The
value of the base is determined by the VAT administration, based on information
supplied by the bottler and based on its own checks. This is a more or less
standard method of excise tax administration.
The VAT on soft drinks is usually collected at the factory at the general tax
rate, on a base that is the ex-factory price including the excise tax paid and
distribution costs. Because the excise tax is included in the base, one could
argue that there is an additional element of discrimination in the VAT regime.
Specifically, the VAT base for soft drinks is higher by the amount of the excise
tax rate.

4

It should be noted, however that in some countries, certain imported raw materials for
agricultural production are fully exempt, and others are given special exemptions.
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Under such a tax regime, soft drinks will be subject to a tax rate (r*) of
r* =
while other goods face a rate of
where:
= special excise tax rate
= general value added tax rate
At the rate levels that are more or less common in Africa (about 15 percent for
and from 5-50 percent for

), the after tax difference in the relative price of

soft drinks vs. other products could be substantial in countries that levy a special
excise.

2.2 The Practice in Africa.
There is a wide variation in the practice of soft drink taxation in Africa.
The countries that make up the Southern Africa Region have a value added tax
and do not impose a special tax on soft drinks. On the other hand, many other
African countries that do levy a VAT also levy a special excise on soft drinks.
There is no easily read pattern that flags the institutional arrangements or
economic structure of countries that choose to levy a special excise vs. those
that do not.
As may be seen from Table 2, there is significant variation in the rate of
special excise tax on soft drinks among African countries. Among VAT countries,
the ad valorem rates are as low as 2.75 percent in Senegal and 5 percent in
Chad, but as high as 20 percent in Ghana. In Ethiopia and Angola, which do not

6
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levy a VAT, the tax rate on soft drinks is 80 percent and 20 percent, respectively
(Table 3).

3 What Constitutes Discriminatory Treatment?
Fairness in taxation would call for soft drinks to be treated the same as
any other consumption good, unless there is a proper justification for not doing
so. The difficulty here is defining a proper justification. In fact, there are many
different views about the rationale for imposing a differentially higher rate of tax
on soft drinks. For economists interested in economic efficiency, the answer is
an easy one. If the consumption of a good imposes a social cost, such as might
come from a Negative impact on health, it is a candidate for a special excise tax
to discourage its consumption. For some social reformers, the issue may be that
production of the good siphons off scarce resources within the country and
increases the profits of foreign-owned companies. For those who see vertical
equity as a pressing need in tax reform, the strategy of labeling a soft drink a
luxury good and taxing it more heavily, holds great appeal. Many governments
use all of these as proper justifications for raising more revenues from special
excises. If the justifications really are supported by the evidence, advocates can
argue that special excises on soft drinks do not constitute an unwarranted
differential treatment. This is not to say that special excises are the best
instrument for achieving the policy objective, but in some normative sense they
are not discriminatory.
On the face of it, all of these justifications for a special excise on soft
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drinks have some merit. But, each may be effectively challenged on a basis of
having the facts wrong about soft drink consumption, or because a special excise
on soft drinks would introduce some unwanted inequity in the consumption tax
system, or because other important complications and costs have been ignored.
For example, if there is evidence of an external effect, the question will be how to
choose a tax rate that will discourage soft drink consumption by the desired
amount?

If the use of scarce national resources is the concern, then the

question will be what “better” investments are being crowded out.

If vertical

equity is the issue, then the problem will be to identify all luxury goods that
should be subjected to special taxation. So, even if there is something to the
“proper justification” reasoning, much remains to be done to translate this into a
sensible policy.
Some justifications fail the good policy test by a wider margin. One is the
revenue enhancement argument, i.e., that a special excise is good tax policy
because administration is easy and because the politics are right, even if there is
no other justification. This would seem wrong-headed. Surely there are better,
non-discriminatory ways to mobilize additional revenues (Cnossen, 2005).
Another reason for special excises, not often explicitly discussed, is the
protection of domestic companies that produce substitute products. The negative
effects of protection on the economy are widely discussed.
The foreign companies that profit from soft drink consumption will argue
against any differential tax treatment. Even if they concede that an external social
cost is present, they may take the position that the excise tax is too high relative

8
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to other goods that impose social costs. The soft drink producers may take the
position that reduction, or even elimination of the excise tax will not lead to a
revenue loss because of the increased production that will follow the tax cuts.
Often, however, even correct arguments made by the companies are obscured
by the transparency of their tax reduction motive. Other times, the soft drink
company’s proposals are dismissed because the arguments are badly made, for
example that employment generated by soft drinks production warrants lower
taxes. Sometimes, however, the lobbying efforts of the soft drink companies are
successful.

4 Externalities from Soft Drink Consumption
Candidates for a discriminatory excise are tested for whether or not they
impose an external cost. For example, it may be argued that the consumption of
cigarettes imposes health risks to smokers and to those who are around
smokers, productivity losses in the work place, and health care costs on society.
The consumption of liquor might be argued to increase costs to society in the
form of increased automobile accidents, drinking-related crime, and the
maintenance of alcohol abuse centers. Gasoline consumption is associated with
increased levels of air pollution and increased congestion that must be suffered
by others.
Society seems to accept the idea that tax policy can be used to curb
consumption of the offending goods, and/or that it is desirable for consumers and
producers of those products to compensate society. However, in practice,
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revenues are rarely earmarked for purposes of paying for these social costs, or
to compensate those who are harmed.5 Moreover, the tax rates are rarely set
with reference to the estimated amount of external costs, emphasizing again the
fact that the revenue mobilization motive is paramount.

4.1 Health Concerns
The issue most often raised in the case of soft drinks is whether there are
negative health effects associated with soft drink consumption and whether these
are large enough to justify a discriminatory tax. Carbonated soft drinks are
thought by many to be associated with a number of health-related problems.
Among these concerns are obesity, diabetes, bone health, and dental problems.
This is a special concern in Africa, where there is a high incidence of ill health
related to heavy consumption of sugar. The number of people seeking medical
assistance for diabetes is rising in Africa at a time when health experts say the
continent's overburdened health care systems are ill-equipped to diagnose the
disease and the majority of the poor cannot afford the cost of treatment 9world
Diabetes Foundation, 2010). The industry argues that these concerns about the
linkage between soft drinks and diabetes are misplaced and not supported by
scientific evidence. (The Coca Cola company, 2003).
We do not comment further on the scientific merit of these arguments.

If

there are not health-related external effects, there is little more to say here about

5

An interesting note on earmarking of the excise tax on soft drinks (or table waters) is that the tax
in Ireland was originally earmarked to support the Boer War, while that imposed in the US in 1918
was dedicated to WWI finances.
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this justification for a special excise. So, let us assume for the sake of discussion
that there are negative health effects associated with the consumption of soft
drinks. Even with this assumption, however, the case for a special excise on soft
drinks will depend on whether the offending ingredients are contained only in
carbonated beverages. Most often mentioned in this regard are sugar,
phosphoric acid, caffeine and aspartame. These are, in fact, widely used
ingredients. If government is convinced that these ingredients do impose a health
risk, then all products containing these substances should be subjected the same
tax treatment. If excessive sugar content is the problem, then the tax should be
levied on all offending products, and should not single out soft drinks.
The taxation of products according to their mix of ingredients is not so farfetched. For example, a proposal for a “sugar tax” in Iceland would be levied on
all products that contain a high percentage of sugar, such as candy and soft
drinks (Tax Notes International, June 2009). Structuring taxes around ingredients
is likely to be a more difficult task for developing countries, but it could be done.

4.2 Environmental Concerns
Another possible external effect from soft drink consumption is the
environmental cost associated with disposal of the aluminum, plastic and glass
containers. The question here is who should pay this cost. Does this justify a
differentially higher tax on soft drinks than on other products?
The answer to this question parallels that given for health concerns.
Carbonated soft drinks are not the only product that imposes an external cost
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associated with packaging. On the one hand, there can be little argument but that
consumers of soft drinks should bear their share of these costs. On the other
hand, the share of the carbonated beverage industry in containers is relatively
small. For Ireland, it is estimated that only about 2 percent of all household
volume of waste is beverage containers (Bahl and Walker, p 9). This suggests
that other consumer good industries should be subject to a similar tax based on
their potential waste and recycle cost. A special excise levied only on carbonated
beverage consumption would not seem justified on these grounds. A tax to
recover the cost of disposal for packaged goods, however, may be well beyond
the reach of the tax administration in most low income countries.

4.3 Rough Justice
The externality justification for an excise tax is generally accepted, but it
provides more of a rough guideline for taxation than a hard and fast rule. It also
requires subjective decisions about when a “taxable external event” should be
declared.

In fact, there are externalities associated with most consumption.

Soccer games can lead to riots, fast foods might impose health and productivity
costs, TV can lead to aberrant behavior, etc.

All consumption that leads to

external effects is not subject to a special tax, and few would argue that all
problems with external effects should be solved with tax policy. The operational
question is where to draw the line when deciding on which products should be
subjected to excise tax.
Even if a government does find the externality argument convincing, then
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it must establish an excise tax rate for soft drinks. There are two factors that it
might consider in doing this. First, since governments rarely if ever even attempt
to make an estimate of social costs, the tax rate cannot be determined as a cost
recovery amount. More likely it is set so as to generate a certain (target) amount
of revenue and probably is influenced by the rate in other countries in the region.
Second, there is the question of the relative level of the tax rate for soft
drinks vis a vis competing goods. If soft drinks are in a category with malt drinks,
energy drinks, flavored waters and juices, then what is the justification for taxing
these at different rates? The practice varies on this. The same rate is applied to
soft drinks and malt beverages in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, but malt
beverages are subject to a lower rate in Ghana.
A related issue is establishing the correct rate difference between soft
drinks and the presumably more socially costly consumption of liquor, beer and
tobacco. There is no straightforward answer here but the varied practice
illustrates the difficulty of making this decision. For example, in Senegal, soft
drinks are taxed at 2.75 percent but coffee and tea at 5 percent while in GuineaBissau, soft drinks and beer are both taxed at 5 percent.

5 Resource Allocation
Governments use tax policy to support an export-led economic
development strategy. One argument is that production and consumption of nonessential goods and services will crowd out more productive uses of resources in
the economy, i.e., investment in capital intensive, export-oriented industries.
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Another concern is that production of consumer goods may place a heavy
enough claim on natural resources that more productive activities may be limited.
For example, soft drinks production places a significant claim on water
resources, which might be scarce. These concerns might lead to higher rates for
the general consumption tax, or to tax incentives to directly influence savings and
investment.
The same reasoning is followed by some government planners who would
impose an excise tax regime on a small number of products e.g., soft drinks,
cigarette lighters, TV sets, cosmetics, etc. By discouraging the consumption of
these products, it is thought that resources would be freed up for the more
productive sectors. The “social engineers” may also have a protection motive,
i.e., discouraging the consumption of foreign-produced luxury goods in favor of
consumption of domestically produced goods.
There are many questions to ask about this justification for special
excises. First, it substitutes administrative decisions for market signals about
what production is "best" for the economy, and raises the more general question
about the extent to which the economy will be planned or market driven.
Second, it would seem to fit a full employment economy --- where skilled labor
will be displaced by soft drink production --- than an African economy. Third, if
protection is part of this discriminatory tax regime, inefficiency in domestic
production may be encouraged, and the more fundamental reforms in economic
policy may be delayed or postponed. Fourth, such policies require governments
to identify those goods that will be subject to the special excise, and to name the

14
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rates of tax, and these decisions will almost certainly be arbitrary. One set of tax
engineers may want to discourage the consumption of soft drinks and cameras,
another may target TV sets and matches, and yet another would narrow the tax
rate differential between soft drinks and beer.

For all of these reasons, an

increase in the general consumption tax is a better route than an excise on
certain goods.
Some analysts have cautioned that the imposition of a special excise tax
will create other undesirable resource allocation effects, particularly in the case of
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages (Bird and Wallace, 2006).

For example,

smuggling of cigarettes is largely attributable to a differentially higher excise tax
rate compared to surrounding countries. A higher tax rate on liquor might cause
consumers to shift toward home brews that are both outside the tax net and may
pose some serious health hazards. Such undesirable displacement effects in
consumption are not likely to happen in the case of soft drinks, because of the
bulkiness of the item (in the case of smuggling) and the limited availability of
lower priced (illegally produced) domestic substitutes.
Finally, there is the question of whether discriminatory taxation of soft
drinks imposes excess burdens on society. The answer to this question is that
(in the absence of external effects) it does, by causing consumers to shift away
from their most desired consumption choices toward other products that are
more favored by the tax system. This can happen because fruit juices, soft
drinks and non alcoholic malt beverages are taxed at different rates, and
because foodstuff items in general are not subject to an excise tax.
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The excess burden imposed by a discriminatory tax on soft drinks
depends on the level of the tax rate and the price elasticity of demand, i.e., on
the amount by which consumption of soft drinks is displaced because of the
resulting higher (relative price) of the product. Certainly the level of the tax rate
on soft drinks is high enough to influence consumption levels. Given this tax
rate, the more price elastic the demand, the greater will be the excess burden.
Some would make the argument that not much damage is done to consumption
patterns by the tax on soft drinks because demand is price inelastic. In fact,
however, there are a number of substitutes (malt drinks, fruit juices, coffee, tea,
and even beer.), which suggests that demand is not price inelastic. The very
limited amount of research available on this subject in industrialized countries
has concluded that the price elasticity of demand for soft drinks is about unity
(Bahl, Bird and Walker, 2003). As we discuss further below, the imposition of a
special excise tax on soft drinks does not lead to a large excess burden.

6 Vertical Equity
Special excises are sometimes defended on grounds that they are
imposed on luxury goods (such as soft drinks) to improve the overall
progressivity of the tax system. Many analysts subscribe to this view. Bolnick
and Haughton (1998) in a study of African countries concluded that excise taxes
should include a small number of luxury items and that increased reliance on
excise taxes is consistent with an equitable tax system. However, they stop
short of defining “luxury items”. In terms of the practice, the more commonly

16

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

taxed “luxury goods” are cameras, electronic equipment, stereos, air conditioning
units, and club dues. Goode (1984, p. 148) also argues that selective taxes on
luxury consumption may offer a better chance of reaching the rich than do badly
administered income taxes.
The vertical equity case for a special excise tax on soft drinks is not so
easily made. Three questions might be raised. The first is whether the distribution
of tax burdens is progressive for soft drinks? There are not a great number of
empirical studies of the distribution of tax burdens for excisable goods. Bahl and
Wallace (2006) estimated the tax burden distribution for Ghana, using the
consumer expenditure survey and assuming full forward shifting of the tax. The
results show that the distribution of the burden on total excise taxes is
progressive. However, this result is influenced by the heavier consumption of
beer and petroleum products in the upper income brackets. Cigarettes, on the
other hand, show a regressive pattern. The distribution of tax burdens for soft
drinks was found to be mildly progressive. Younger (1996) reached a similar
conclusion for the distribution of tax burdens for non-alcoholic beverages. So, it
might be concluded that the same degree of progressivity for alcoholic beverages
and motor fuels cannot be imputed to soft drinks.
The second question is whether the imposition of a special tax on soft
drinks would have a noticeable effect on the distribution of tax burdens. While it
would appear to be the case that soft drinks are consistent with the idea of luxury
consumption in that the share of consumer expenditures rises with income level,
the amount of taxes paid on this product is quite small, and could have only a
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Even if all

consumption of luxury goods were brought under this tax, the share of total
consumption would be small. Cnossen (2005, p 511) makes the point that for
purposes of improving the progressivity of the tax system, “Probably the motoring
field is the only case for which luxury excises can be recommended.”
If the objective is to tax consumption that is heavily weighted toward
higher income families, there are many more items than soft drinks that also
should be included. The practice in African countries shows a great deal of
variation in what government fiscal planners consider to be a “luxury”. The usual
suspects are TV and electronic equipment, clocks, cameras, cosmetics and
jewelry, but the list can be quite long and includes in various countries, cellular
air time, matches, coffee and tea, candles and toys (See Tables 2 and 3).
These reservations would seem to tilt policy away from using a special
excise of soft drinks to improve the vertical equity of the tax system. One is
probably left with Cnossen’s (2006, p168-169) admonition: there are better ways
to effect the tax burden distribution than with selective excises.

7 Immoral Behavior
A special excise tax may be levied for “moral” reasons. Drinking and
smoking are seen by some as immoral activities that ought to be discouraged,
and higher taxes are imposed to raise the price of these activities in hopes of
curtailing consumption. This argument is based on philosophical views rather
than economics and cannot be evaluated using economic theory or even first

18
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principles of tax policy. It is difficult to see how the consumption of soft drinks
would offend national sensibilities.
There also is a paternalistic argument. The price elasticity of teenage
smoking appears to be greater than that of adults. An argument is that higher
priced cigarettes would discourage smoking among youth. A similar argument
might be made with reference to teenage obesity and soft drink consumption.
However, on these grounds, soft drink consumption is not the only legitimate
target for a special excise.

8 The Revenue Justification
Revenue mobilization is arguably the most important reason for excise
taxation, and probably the dominant reason for levying an special excise on soft
drinks. The rationale is straightforward. Soft drinks are “easy to tax” in that
production is concentrated in a few plants and can be reached with relatively little
effort by the collection authority.6 Likewise, imported inputs and final consumer
products are easily reached. Moreover, the traditional excisable goods are often
the product of foreign-owned firms that have a higher rate of voluntary
compliance.

8.1 Revenue Potential
The revenue potential of a special excise tax on soft drinks depends on

6

The premise that excises taxes are easily administered is based partly on the presumption that
here is no need for accounts, audits or other complicated compliance procedures (Goode, 1984;
Terper, 2001).
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the size of the tax base (soft drink consumption) and on the price elasticity of
demand. The base is very narrow, surely well less than one percent of GDP,
hence a price inelastic demand is necessary for any significant amount of
revenue generation.7
Soft drinks will be price inelastic in demand if consumers cannot find good
substitutes for these products. As a result, they will respond to a special excise
by consuming at a level close to their pretax consumption level. Gasoline,
alcoholic beverages and tobacco are commodities that are widely believed to fit
this profile, and empirical research has verified this (McLure and Thirsk, 1978;
Viscusi, 2006; and Leung and Phelps, 1993). Bird and Wallace (2006), however,
find evidence of strong substitutability for alcohol products in Africa and hence a
higher price elasticity than is usually supposed.
There is relatively little by way of quantitative estimates of the price
elasticity of demand for soft drinks in developing countries. For Africa, BaahNuakoh, et.al (2000) estimate a price elasticity of 1.5 for Ghana based on an
econometric analysis for the period 1975-1998.
The demand for soft drinks may be more price elastic than other excisable
goods because of the availability of a larger number of substitutes. Substitutes
for soft drinks will vary from country to country. Among the most obvious are
water, fruit juices, flavored waters, syrups and energy drinks, but there are many
other possibilities including perhaps ice cream, candy, and entertainment in
general. At least one review of the soft drink industry in the European economy
7

For discussions of this issue, see Tanzi (1991, Chapters 8 and 10), Bird (1992, Chapter 9), and
Due (1988, Chapter 4).
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suggested the wide range of consumer choices available (reported in Bahl and
Walker, 1999). In a supermarket in Britain, there were 450 “buying options” for
nonalcoholic beverages. Using a similar measurement method, it estimated that
there were 320 in Belgium, 480 in France, 500 in Germany, 235 in Netherlands,
250 in Spain, and 170 in Italy. And if soft drinks are partly consumed as a
general entertainment good, they may be replaced by more expenditures on
movies, ice cream, etc.,
This thinking would lead us to the conclusion that consumers will move to
substitutes if discriminatory taxes are imposed, and will increase their
consumption of soft drinks if discriminatory taxes are remained. In the latter case,
the increased consumption will cushion (but not eliminate) any revenue loss
occasioned by a tax rate reduction. A statistical analysis of the Irish experience
supports this conclusion, (Bahl and Walker, 1998).
It is clear that revenue yield from excise taxes is significant and is an
important part of the government finance structure. Cnossen (2005) points out
that excise taxes account for 16 percent of tax revenues in ASEAN countries. In
Africa, the use of excises is quite varied. For example, Uganda and the DRC
receive large portions of their revenue from excise (32 and 24 percent
respectively) while Botswana receives less than 3 percent of revenue from excise
taxes (Bird and Wallace, 2006).
However data do not let us report comparable statistics for excise tax
revenues from soft drinks. Case studies suggest that the collections are quite
small, e.g., about 0.3 percent of total tax collections in Ghana (Bahl and Wallace,
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2006).

8.2 Political Considerations
Soft drinks are an attractive target because the political risk among the
population is fairly low. "Why not let smokers, drivers, drinkers and consumers of
luxury products finance a share of the budget deficit," is a sentiment that seems
to resonate well with voters. So does “tax the foreigners” to the extent voters
believe the tax will fall on owners of the producing firm.
Special excises feel like a “smaller” tax reform to the public, and an
increase in the tax rate on gasoline or beer is a "quick revenue fix" because the
collection machinery is already in place and the money can begin to flow quickly.
Increased excise taxes on drinking, smoking and luxury consumption are less
dangerous in the eyes of a vote-seeking politician than are rate increases on the
broad-based taxes.
The good politics argument is probably a better fit for developing than
industrial countries. It was finally good economics and EU harmonization efforts
rather than taxpayer outcry that brought on the abolition of the discriminatory
excise duties in many European countries.

Of course, the industry kept the

pressure on to roll the taxes back. Soft drink producers are always unhappy
about discriminatory treatment, knowing that their products sell best when prices
are kept low and on par with those of competing products. A possible reason for
the absence of vocal taxpayer opposition to extra taxes on soft drinks is that
these often are not directly collected from consumers. Most taxpayers may not
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fully realize the extent to which the tax has increased the price of the beverage,
thus making excise duties “invisible”.8

9 Tax Policy Choices for Soft Drinks
There are a number of policy choices open for the taxation of soft drinks:
impose a special excise on soft drinks, reform the existing special excise tax on
soft drinks, and reduce or eliminate the special excise on soft drinks. All three of
these options have received significant play in recent years and various
governments have followed all three paths.

9.1 Impose a special excise
The case for a special excise on soft drinks may not be strong, but the
revenue needs of African governments are substantial. Even small contributions
to the general budget make a difference. Moreover, there are positive features of
an excise tax on soft drinks: administration is manageable, and there is not likely
to be a major political uproar over the imposition of the tax.
Standing against this option are several considerations. One is that the
revenue gains from taxing soft drinks may be less than the amounts expected by
those who impose the tax.

The actual net revenue gains depend on a

complicated chain of events that follows the imposition of the tax. To the extent
that demand is price elastic, and if the company passes the tax along to
consumers, the consumption of soft drinks may be displaced in favor of

8

A poll conducted in the Netherlands in 1992, however, showed that most consumers strongly
disagreed with the imposition of this tax (as reported in Bahl and Walker, 1999).
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at

lower

rates.

Reduced

consumption/production of soft drinks will lead to reduced income, payroll and
general consumption taxes, though some of this might be made up with
expanded production of substitute goods. Depending on these factors, the net
revenue increase from a special excise tax on soft drinks may be small.
Whatever net revenues are derived from a special excise tax will come at
some cost and these should be carefully evaluated. One cost is that an ad hoc
tax levied on a single product might dissuade potential foreign investors for fear
they would encounter the same treatment. Another cost is the possible reduction
in production in the bottling plants, which are a formal sector employer and
therefore in the income tax net.

If the country is not operating at a full

employment level, these workers may not be reabsorbed into the formal sector.
Finally, whenever a discriminatory tax is levied, the change in relative
prices (in the absence of externalities) leads to an excess burden. But since the
revenues raised from the excise tax are usually so small, the excess burden will
not be very great in terms of national impacts. Bahl, Bird and Walker (2003)
estimate that the welfare loss from elimination of the tax on soft drinks in Ireland
is equivalent to only about one percent of the amount of revenue raised.

9.2 Reform the Excise Tax
Another option that may be considered in countries that impose a special
excise on soft drinks, is to reform the tax structure. A not-so-often discussed
issue of soft drink taxation is the need to find a rate parity among all of the
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substitute products in the soft drink category. However, it is not uncommon to
find rate differentials among non-alcoholic beverages including soft drinks,
flavored waters, juices, and malt beverages.

Reform might concentrate on

rationalizing the rate structure by taxing substitute goods at the same rate, unless
there is a compelling reason not to.

In the cases mentioned above, sugar

content might constitute such a reason, but it is not clear that this would lead to
much differentiation in the rates between soft drinks, juices and flavored waters.
However, it should be noted that in many countries, the tax rate on juices reflects
the “real juice” content of the drink (e.g., 15 percent in Thailand).
A second dimension to the rate rationalization is the differential between
the rate applied to soft drinks and that applied to liquor and beer. One would
imagine that at the least the externality argument would lead to large differences.
However, in some countries, the differentials are small.

Reform in this area

might focus on the estimated difference in social costs imposed by the
consumption of these products.

9.3 Eliminate the Excise Tax on Soft Drinks
Some combination of all of the factors suggested above have led
countries to reduce or eliminate the special excise on soft drinks. In the sample
of countries considered here, many do not presently have such a special excise.
Many other countries around the world have rolled their excises back.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument behind the removal of the
discriminatory taxes is that the revenue loss will be significantly dampened (or
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offset) by an increase in consumption that would come from the lower price of
soft drinks. The thinking here is that a lower level of taxation would result in a
lower price of soft drinks to consumers, production would expand and some of
the loss in revenues would be recaptured by the increase in taxes on the
imported content, the increased taxes on bottlers and distributors (income taxes
and property taxes) and increases in the general sales tax. In a case study of
the impacts of eliminating the tax on soft drinks in Ireland, Bahl, Bird and Walker
(2003) found that about 30 percent of the excise tax loss was recaptured. There
are two reasons why the recapture was not larger. One is that all of the tax
reduction was not passed along to the consumers in the form of price reductions.
The second is that in order to increase output in the post-tax period, the soft drink
company had to attract resources away from other producers, leading to some
revenue losses in those sectors. In this respect, Ireland’s full employment
economy is very different from the developing country situation, so the percent of
revenue recaptured in the latter is likely greater than the 30 percent reported in
this study.
Bahl and Wallace (2006), using a similar methodology, estimated that
there would be a recapture of 90 percent of the special excise tax revenues
within five years if Ghana had eliminated their excise. This study used a price
elasticity of 1.5. If a lower elasticity is used, the simulations show that a much
longer time period will be needed to recapture the lost revenues.

10 Conclusions
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What we might conclude from this paper is that soft drinks do not fit the
model for a special excise tax in the same way as do cigarettes, alcoholic
beverages and motor fuels. Soft drinks are a class of consumer goods that
contain a large amount of sugar, and this may be harmful to health, but there are
a number of other goods that also contain the same harmful ingredients.
Fairness would dictate treating all of these goods the same way under the tax
code. The same may be said of the environmental costs of disposing of the
packaging of soft drinks.
Neither can a special excise on soft drinks lead to a noticeable
improvement in the distribution of tax burdens, as can a tax on motor fuels or
alcoholic beverages. The tax base is too small (less than one percent of
consumption), and though higher income consumers do spend more for soft
drinks, the degree of progression is mild. There are better ways to address
questions of income redistribution.
So, this leaves us with the revenue raising motive for taxing soft drinks.
What might be concluded on this count is that in order to raise significant
revenue, the ad valorem rate on soft drinks will need to be quite high. But, unlike
other excise goods, soft drinks may not be subject to price inelastic demand.
This means that part of the revenue potential of the tax will be lost to substitute
goods that are taxed at a lower rate.

Some evidence has shown that the

revenue loss from elimination of the special excise on soft drinks will be
recaptured in expanded soft drink production.
What if government is not convinced by these arguments against a special
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excise on soft drinks and moves ahead with imposition of such a tax. What is the
harm? First, because the tax is so small, the excess burden is not likely to be
large. On the other hand, such ad hoc tax measures may dissuade investors for
fear they would be treated the same way. There is also the complication that
might be introduced to the tax system by bringing substitute goods into tax and
resolving all of the difficulties due to this. A special excise on soft drinks that did
not consider juices, flavored waters, energy drinks, etc. would invite unfairness
into the tax system. All of this would divert energy away from the basic objectives
of good administration of the broad based taxes.
The revenue needs are great in low income countries, and many African
nations do impose special excises on soft drinks. Experience has taught that
revenue needs and administrative ease can trump good tax policy. As the tax
systems in poor countries improves in its ability to capture the consumption base,
it should become possible to abandon such stopgap revenue measures as
special excises whose main virtue is the ease with which they may be taxed.
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Table 1
Summary of the Typical Tax Treatment of Soft Drinks: Ghana Example
Tax

Base

Rate

Excise

Ex Factory Price

20%

Discriminatory
Treatment?
Yes

Custom duties

c.i.f. value

10%

No

VAT

Ex Factory Price
including excise tax

15%

Yes

Company Income Tax

Chargeable Income

25%

No

PAYE

Taxable Income

Up to 25%

No

Total

---

---

---
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Table 2
VAT and Excise Tax Treatment of Luxury Goods in African Countries with a
value added Tax
Country
Benin
Botswana

VAT Rate
(in percent)
18
10

Excise Rate on Soft
Drinks (in percent)
?
0

Burkino Faso

18

10

Cameroon

19.25

0

Câte ď Ivoire
Central African
Republic

20
18

7
0

Chad
Congo

18
18.9

5
0

Equatorial Guinea

15

0

Gabon

18

0

Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho

12.5
18
10
16
14

20
?
5
0
0

Madagascar

18

0

Malawi

17.5

0

Mali

18

0

Mauritania

14

0

Mauritius

15

0

Mozambique

17

0

Excise Rates on other
“Luxuries”
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks, coffee, tea, cola
nuts
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks
Soft drinks: specific tax
Soft drinks, beer
Sugar, soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
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Namibia

15

0

Niger

19

0

Nigeria

5

0

Senegal
South Africa

18
14

2.75
0

Tanzania
Togo

20
18

?
0

Uganda
Zambia

17
17.5

?
10

Zimbabwe

15

22.5

perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential oils,
perfumery, fire arms (7%).
Sugar, soft drinks
Soft drinks, mobile phone call
time
Soft drinks
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Table 3
Sales Tax and Excise Tax Treatment of Luxury Goods in African Countries
that do not have a Value Added Tax
Country
Angola
Burundi

Type of Sales
Tax
Production
Turnover

Standard
Rate
10
17

Excise Rate on
Soft Drinks
20
0

Comoros

Turnover

10

0

Congo D.R.
Djibouti

Turnover
Import Tax

13
15

?
?

Ethiopia

15

80

Eritrea

10

0

Gambia

15

0

Liberia

Production

14

0

Seychelles

Production

12

0

Swaziland

Production

14

0

Somalia

Production

18.7

0

Excise Rate on other
“Luxuries”
Soft drinks
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Soft drinks
Mineral water, soft drinks,
fruit juice
Mineral water, audio and
video equipment, Soft
drinks, dish washers
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).
Toiletries, TV sets, office
machines (5%); Essential
oils, perfumery, fire arms
(7%).

